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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON COOPERATION 
BETWEEN SUB-CENTRAL TAX ADMINISTRATIONS 
José María Durán-Cabré, Alejandro Esteller-Moré1 and Luca Salvadori2 
Abstract 
The literature on horizontal tax interdependence pays limited attention to interactions in 
administrative policies, although they can play a large role in determining the amount of tax 
revenues collected. We investigate the incentives for sub-central tax authority cooperation in a 
decentralised context, with the aim of identifying the determinants of that cooperation. Our results 
are congruent with standard theory; in particular, the existence of reciprocity is essential for 
sharing tax information, but there is sluggishness in this process, which is partly the result of the 
short-sighted behaviour of tax authorities influenced by budget constraints. Hence, this is good 
news for the functioning of a decentralised tax administration as, in the medium to long run, the 
gains to be made from sharing tax information are achieved.3  
INTRODUCTION 
Tax administration policies are crucial in determining the final amount of revenues collected by 
tax authorities. Furthermore, be it in a federal context with decentralised tax administrations, or 
internationally with different national administrations, tax authorities are dependent on each other 
to enforce tax rules. For example, starting from January 2017, all EU member states will have to 
automatically exchange information on tax rulings given to companies with cross-border 
operations. The aim is to provide national authorities with insight into aggressive tax planning in 
order to protect their tax bases; consequently, cooperation will be essential. In general, improving 
tax enforcement in the global economy has translated into a proliferation of bilateral and 
multilateral treaties between national tax administrations and tax havens. Given these 
circumstances, investigating the determinants of cooperation between tax administrations has 
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become a key issue; yet, the literature on horizontal tax interdependencies pays limited attention 
to these matters.4 
 
We seek to investigate the potential for cooperation in tax administration policies between sub-
central tax authorities by carrying out an empirical analysis in a federal context. This represents 
something of a novelty in the literature and should serve to shed some light on alternative designs 
(centralised vs. decentralised) for tax administration within this context. In doing so, we analyse 
the determinants of information sharing between regional administrations based on the Spanish 
case, which is a good field for empirical research. Spanish regions (the so-called “Comunidades 
Autónomas”, henceforth CAs) have had the power to administer several wealth taxes5 since the 
mid-1980s and, following reforms in 1997 and 2002, have also acquired the legislative power to 
modify significant statutory tax parameters.6 Thus, this case study should serve as a benchmark 
for evaluating the information-sharing process in a decentralised framework and, more generally, 
for analysing the efficiency of a decentralised tax administration scheme. 
 
We focus our empirical analysis on a specific area of potential cooperation between the CAs, the 
only one for which official data is available. In the case of wealth taxation, legal tax allocation 
principles (in Spanish, the so-called “puntos de conexión”) indicate how tax revenues should be 
distributed among the CAs: the residence principle and the territorial (or source) principle, 
depending on the taxable event.7 However, taxpayers are not necessarily aware of these and so 
might commit errors when reporting their tax returns: that is, a taxpayer might pay the tax to the 
wrong CA.8 Thus, each CA should share their information on misreported taxes and transfer the 
corresponding revenue to the competent CA. This is supposedly an automatic practice, but in 
reality it does not always occur this way. Indeed, there is considerable casual evidence confirming 
that the information sharing process between CAs is far from automatic.9  
                                                 
4 The effectiveness of these cooperative policies at an international level has been highly questioned by recent 
empirical literature (e.g. Johannesen & Zucman, 2014). As we will make clear though, our approach is different, as 
we focus on the administrative incentives to cooperate within a federation. 
5 Namely the inheritance and gift tax (IGT), the annual wealth tax (AWT) and the tax on wealth transfers (TWT). 
6 For more details on these reforms, see Esteller-Moré (2008).  
7 In the case of the IGT, three different circumstances may occur. The residence principle applies to all inheritances: 
the tax revenues are collected in the CA of residence of the deceased. This principle also applies for gifts of chattels 
but the relevant residence in this case is that of the donor. Finally, in the case of the gift of real estate, the territorial 
principle applies. The AWT is based on the residence principle, while the TWT is mainly based on the territorial 
principle. 
8 Suppose, for example, that a company with its headquarters in Madrid sells a block of flats located in the CA of 
Andalusia and pays the TWT to the CA of Madrid. In this case, an error has occurred, as the TWT is subject to the 
territorial principle and the tax return should be reported to the CA of Andalusia. Similarly, there is a mistake when 
a daughter living in the CA of Valencia receives an inheritance from her father, whose residence was in the CA of 
Catalonia, and she reports the IGT to the region in which she lives, rather than to Catalonia, as she should have 
according to the allocation principle. 
9 Every year, tax inspectors from the State review the way in which each region administers its ceded taxes and they 
report their findings in the “Informe sobre la cesión de tributos a las Comunidades Autónomas”. For instance, in the 
2006 report about Catalonia, inspectors from the State explain: “It should be noted that existing experiences show an 
unequal behaviour of the different CAs in their degree of compliance with the obligation to submit the information 
and the income due to the competent CA. The perception that the competent services of the Directorate General of 
Taxes of the Catalan government have on this issue is that certain CAs systematically and, in many cases, violate that 
obligation” (p.39 of the report). Moreover, from informal conversations maintained with former directors of the 
Catalan Tax Authority, we know that in some cases they chose not to transmit information to other CAs until the latter 
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This situation might arise because every CA faces a trade-off between, on the one hand, 
cooperating by transmitting the information and the misreported tax revenues to other CAs, and, 
on the other, not cooperating and retaining the misreported tax revenues. The costs of cooperation 
are mainly administrative (being related directly to this information-sharing process) and financial 
(a loss of revenue yields). The benefits of cooperation are based on reciprocity: if a CA cooperates, 
it might foster other regions’ cooperation in the future. For this reason, if a CA does not cooperate, 
there may be a cost, as the other CAs will opt not to exchange information in the future. In a 
repeated game, cooperative behaviour should produce mutual benefits for both CAs, since the 
benefits due to reciprocity should be higher than the administrative and financial costs in the short-
run. Therefore, our main hypothesis is that a CA’s cooperative behaviour is a matter of reciprocity, 
as it depends strictly on the potential cooperation of the other CAs in previous periods.  
 
To test this hypothesis, we estimate a Tobit random-effect model and also a dynamic version of 
this model to account for sluggish adjustment in transmitted tax revenues. Our results confirm the 
role played by reciprocity and indicate the presence of persistency in the strategic behaviour of the 
tax administration. In addition, in keeping with the short-run financial benefits of non-cooperation, 
we find that the impact of reciprocity is lower when the CAs face budget constraints picked up by 
the deficit. Thus, according to our analysis, in the medium to long run, the regional administrations 
learn the advantages of cooperation, thus providing elements that support the correct functioning 
of a decentralised tax administration. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 provides a summary of the relevant 
literature; in section 3 we present our empirical strategy; section 4 presents the results; and we 
conclude in section 5. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature has identified two main sources of horizontal interdependence at a tax administration 
level.10 On the one hand, Cremer and Gahvari (2000), examining the implications of tax evasion 
for fiscal competition and tax harmonisation policies in an economic union, demonstrate the 
possibility of mobility-based competition in tax enforcement policies. They obtain sub-optimal 
equilibrium values for both tax and audit rates, and show that tax harmonisation alone is not 
sufficient to avoid strategic incentives to attract tax bases, as there can be no commitment to audit 
policies. Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré and Salvadori (2015) have tested this result for the Spanish 
decentralised framework and corroborate the presence of mobility-based competition in tax 
enforcement among regional administrations.  
 
On the other hand, the incentive for sub-central tax authorities to collaborate by sharing relevant 
tax information has also been accounted for in the literature that has focussed on the incentives for 
tax cooperation between countries to reduce evasion in an international mobile-capital framework 
                                                 
opted to do the same with their misreported taxes. This seems to suggest that ‘reciprocity’ might play a relevant role 
in determining the extent to which information is shared between CAs. Indeed, in the 2002 report about another CA, 
Castile and León, the inspectors from the State explain that this region would not return revenues due to the CA of 
Madrid until the latter transferred revenues due to it. 
10 More generally, recent literature has also identified the incentives for vertical transmission of information between 
central and local governments in a federal framework. Dreher, Gehring, Kotsogiannis and Marchesi (2014) explore 
the role of this information transmission process in explaining the optimal degree of decentralisation across countries.  
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(see Keen & Ligthart (2006a) for a survey). In particular, the seminal study by Bacchetta and 
Espinosa (1995) identifies the strategic trade-off between competitive behaviour (lowering the tax 
rate to increase foreign investment) and cooperative behaviour (voluntarily sharing information to 
reduce international tax evasion). In equilibrium, the second effect may dominate the former, 
resulting in partial information exchange. In a more recent study, Bacchetta and Espinosa (2000) 
further their previous analysis by modelling the choice of tax rates and information provision as 
an infinitely repeated game. A contribution in this same line is provided by Huizinga and Nielsen 
(2002), who model a repeated game in which tax authorities choose between withholding taxes 
and sharing information as alternatives for dealing with international capital income and profit 
taxation.11  
 
Both studies argue that potential cooperation in information sharing is a matter of reciprocity and, 
in particular, that it may be sustained if the process is viewed as an infinitely repeated game rather 
than as a single one. In this regard, the propensity of a country to cooperate directly depends on 
the potential cooperative behaviour of the other country in previous periods. Thus, in these models, 
each country evaluates the trade-off between not providing information and obtaining a 
corresponding temporary gain (due to their attracting tax evading investors) versus suffering the 
costs of the non-cooperative behaviour of the other country (generally, more aggressive tax 
competition, or the absence of information exchange, or both) forever after.  
 
Our empirical framework reflects existing theoretical models – given the existence of a trade-off 
between cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour – but applied to a federal context. The main 
differences between the two contexts lie in the tax authorities’ motivation and incentive to 
cooperate. In an international framework with mobile capital, countries share fiscal information 
with the aim of avoiding, or of at least reducing, a race to the bottom in tax rates and the resulting 
negative effects on tax revenues. This kind of cooperation between countries reduces tax fraud. In 
our federal context, we focus on the potential existence of cooperation in tax administration 
between sub-central authorities. This is probably more related to tax-management policies than to 
strategic behaviours of the regional tax authorities.12 In a federal framework, a decentralised tax 
administration might enhance efficiency due to a greater ability of sub-central authorities to exploit 
informational advantages on local tax bases (see, for example, Martinez-Vazquez & Timofeev, 
2010). Nonetheless, this is conditional upon the existence of cooperation among sub-central tax 
authorities. That is why it is so important to test for the existence of administrative cooperation.  
 
Some empirical papers have tested these models in an international framework. In particular, 
Ligthart and Voget (2010) study the determinants of tax information sharing between Dutch and 
foreign tax authorities for income tax purposes. From our perspective, the most interesting result 
in this paper concerns reciprocity. The authors show that an increase in the amount of tax 
information provided by the Dutch tax authorities to their foreign counterparts significantly 
increases the amount of information received by the Dutch tax authorities. Elsayyad (2012) 
analyses recent treaty signings between tax havens and OECD countries as the outcome of a 
bargaining process over treaty form and focusses on the presence of an exchange of information 
                                                 
11 These contributions generated further research (e.g. Tanzi & Zee (2001); Chisik & Davies (2004); Keen & Ligthart, 
(2006b). 
12 Note that cooperation by sharing information on misreported taxes should not have implications concerning 
taxpayers’ compliance. 
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clause. The paper shows that the likelihood of treaty-signing is mainly driven by a tax haven’s 
bargaining power and good governance. Moreover, the author finds that it is easier for an OECD 
country to renegotiate an existing treaty so as to incorporate an information exchange clause than 
to pressure countries to do so without an existing agreement. By interpreting the existence of a 
previous agreement between two countries as a measure of reciprocity, we have further 
confirmation that reciprocity matters in determining the level of information exchanged between 
two tax authorities. 
 
In our federal framework, CAs are required to cooperate by law in support to the good organisation 
of the federal tax administration system. To this aim, sub-central tax authorities should 
automatically rectify any errors that might arise in the reporting of tax returns, but they have an 
incentive not to cooperate due to the presence of administrative costs and to the loss of financial 
revenue yields. In this context, and according to our hypothesis, reciprocity should reinforce the 
tax information exchange process by being an important driving force in the promotion of 
cooperation and the enhancement of the functioning of the decentralised tax administration. This 
empirical analysis of a federal framework represents, we believe, a novelty and progress in the 
literature.  
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
In this section, we present the dataset and define the empirical methodology employed in 
developing our analysis. 
 
The Empirical Framework 
 
Data on Spain’s regional tax administrations are extracted from the report “Informe sobre la cesión 
de tributos a las Comunidades Autónomas”, published every year jointly with the project of the 
general State budget. Specifically, we have access to data on the total number and total amount of 
transfers resulting from misreported tax returns (“Transferencias por aplicación de los puntos de 
conexión”) collected (returned) by each CA from (to) any other region during the 1989-2009 
period.13 Hence, in contrast with previous analyses, our dataset allows us to identify both directions 
in the information-sharing process. Additionally, the availability of a time span allows us to adopt 
a dynamic approach and, thus, to test for the possibility that regional administrations learn the 
potential advantages of gradually sharing information.  
 
Our endogenous variable is the amount of tax revenues transferred by each CA to every other CA 
in a given year and thus takes the form of a continuous random variable over strictly positive 
values, but it assumes the value zero with positive probability. Our dataset contains 43.02 percent 
zero-valued output. Thus, our endogenous variable may be censored at zero inasmuch as a zero 
value could alternatively indicate an actual absence of misreported taxes, or that CAs choose not 
to share information on misreported taxes and claim to have zero tax revenues to transmit. 
                                                 
13 For instance, in 2000, the region of Andalusia transferred 828,192 euros to the region of Castile-La Mancha, 
corresponding to seven cases of misreported taxes. And the latter, for example, transferred 15,872.9 euros to the region 
of Valencia, corresponding to 33 cases.  
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Therefore, we maintain the random-effects Tobit corner-solution model as our main approach (see 
Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 518-549)14, which is defined as follows:15 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 = max[0, 𝛼𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝒀𝒊𝒋𝒕𝜷 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝝁 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜗𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡]                                (1)  
 
where 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the amount of misreported tax revenues transmitted by region i to region j 
during year t. We control for reciprocity through the misreported tax revenues received by region 
i from region j during the previous year, 𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1. This is the key regressor, since our main 
hypothesis is that reciprocity fosters cooperation between regional tax authorities and then we 
expect 𝛼 to be positive. More precisely, if 𝛼 is equal to zero, receiving tax revenues from CA j 
does not encourage a transmission of revenues by CA i. This could mean that CA i does not have 
any case of misreported taxes to transmit or that it does not have incentives to do it. Instead, a 
strictly positive 𝛼 surely indicates that there are cases of misreported taxes and, most importantly, 
that CA i has some incentives to transmit the corresponding misreported tax revenues.  
 
We introduce a series of control variables that account for both region pair-specific characteristics 
and unilateral determinants referring to region i that might influence the information-sharing 
process. The pair-specific variables are collected in vector 𝒀𝒊𝒋𝒕. In particular, 𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the number of 
cases of misreported taxes transmitted from region i to region j in year t. According to Ligthart 
and Voget (2010), the distance between regions might reduce the flow of information between 
them. Indeed, this variable accounts for both higher transaction costs and lower cultural proximity, 
which are relevant issues in a federal framework.16 Therefore, we control for 𝐷𝑖𝑗 the physical 
distance in kilometres between i and j. The political alignment between Spanish regions17 is 
another variable that might have an impact on the tax administrations’ willingness to cooperate. 
Thus, we introduce 𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡, a dummy identifying the political alignment between the two regions at 
time t. The relative GDP of the two regions at time t, 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 is also included in order to account 
for the relative economic power of the two regions; that is, as a measure of the relative bargaining 
position of region i with respect to region j (Elsayyad, 2012). A positive (negative) sign would 
indicate a favourable (unfavourable) bargaining position of region i with respect to region j due to 
a higher (lower) amount of revenues transmitted by region i to region j.  
 
The vector 𝑿𝒊𝒕 includes a constant term and the unilateral variables. According to the previous 
literature on the exchange of tax information (Bacchetta & Espinosa, 1995, 2000), the statutory 
tax parameters and the enforcement costs are crucial in determining the level of information 
                                                 
14 In a previous version of this paper, we employed the number of cases of misreported taxes transmitted as our 
endogenous variable. Given that this is a count-data variable, we used an estimation strategy based on Poisson 
regression models obtaining results that are congruent with those obtained through the current estimation strategy. 
These results are available upon request. 
15 A limit of our database is intrinsic in the absence of a counterfactual: we are not able to disentangle a priori if a zero 
valued number of cases of misreported taxes is due to an actual absence of cases of misreported taxes or to a strategic 
uncooperative behaviour. Nevertheless, the methodology we employ appropriately takes this shortcoming into 
account. 
16 On the one hand, since we analyse a long period of time, including many years before the “internet era”, this variable 
is relevant in measuring larger operational costs due to a longer distance between two regions. On the other hand, the 
distance between regions in the same federal country might also be relevant in representing the level of cultural 
affinity. 
17 Please note: this factor is specific for an analysis within a federal context. 
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exchange between tax authorities. These issues are also relevant in our context, albeit in a different 
way; thus, we control for 𝑇𝑜𝑡_𝑅𝑒𝑔_𝑇𝑎𝑥_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 and 𝑇𝑜𝑡_𝑅𝑒𝑔_𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 that 
account for total tax revenues and total tax auditing revenues collected by region i during year t, 
respectively. These variables are proxies of regional tax autonomy in raising revenues and they are 
expected to be associated with greater amounts of information being exchanged. Budgetary and 
political variables might also play a role in determining tax administration policies (see, for 
example, Esteller-Moré, 2005, 2011). In particular, we control for the deficit expected at the 
beginning of every fiscal period in order to account for the financial conditions of regional budgets 
and to measure indirectly the financial opportunity cost of cooperation of region i. We expect a 
higher deficit to negatively impact the transmission of misreported revenues. We return to this 
variable below. We include the total amount of transfers received from the central government 
divided by total regional expenditure to account for a further budgetary factor relevant in a federal 
framework, such as that operated in Spain. We expect this variable to have an income effect on 
the behaviour of the tax administrations. In particular, a higher transfer-expenditure ratio should 
force the administration to rely less on its own tax resources and to transfer more tax revenues to 
the other regions.  
 
We are not able to identify the impact of the administrative costs of cooperation, but reasonably 
suppose it to be constant over time. As such, it will be picked up by the constant term; however, if 
it varies over time (and uniformly throughout the CAs) it will be picked up by the time effects. In 
the case of the political variables, we include a dummy equal to one, 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑡, if there is a regional 
election in 𝑖 CA during the year 𝑡, to control for the potential impact of the electoral cycle on the 
incentives to share information. To account for modifications to the statutory tax parameters, we 
include a dummy, 𝐷𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡, equal to one if the regional government 𝑖 introduces a deduction in (at 
least) one tax during the year18. 𝐿𝑒𝑓𝑡𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to one if the party in office in a 
specific region and year is to the left of the political spectrum. 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the total population and 
accounts for regional size. At the same time, when regions acquired some tax power to modify 
those taxes ceded by the central government (in 1997 and 2002), a formal forum of interaction 
between each regional tax administration and the central one (bilateral nature), but also one of 
multilateral nature, was set up. This might have had an impact on the cooperation among regional 
tax administrations. However, it is not possible to identify its effect due to the absence of 
qualitative or quantitative information on the activity of these forums. Nevertheless, we implicitly 
account for this effect by including a set of time dummies, 𝜏𝑡. We finally introduce fixed effects 
(𝜗𝑖𝑗) to account for unobserved heterogeneity among CAs
19, while 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error 
that varies across time and pair of regions.20 The parameters of Eq. (1) are estimated by maximum 
likelihood.  
 
 
                                                 
18 In our framework – in contrast with the hypothesis proposed by Bachetta and Espinosa (1995) – it is unlikely that a 
CA behaves strategically and lowers the tax burden via tax rate cuts so as to induce, to a certain measure, taxpayers 
to err in their tax returns: taxpayers would pay less and the CA would collect more tax revenues. All the same, in our 
case, it is difficult to identify such behaviour, since the information on the misreported tax revenues transmitted is 
available at an aggregated level and not tax by tax. 
19 The “quality of the tax administration” would be an interesting control variable, as rightly suggested by a reviewer. 
However, this cannot be identified from our data, so we cannot identify its impact. The fixed effects should control 
for it as long as we suppose administrative quality does not vary much over time.   
20 In particular, 𝜗𝑖𝑗~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜗) and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀). 
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In order to have a better understanding of the determinants of the tax information sharing process, 
we extend this model in a dynamic fashion allowing for sluggish adjustment in the endogenous 
variable. It might take time for the regional tax authorities to process all the misreported tax 
revenues, so inertia might play a role in this process. Thus, following Wooldridge (2002, pp. 542-
543), we also estimate a dynamic Tobit model with unobserved effects: 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 = max[0, 𝛾𝑔(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1) + 𝛿𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝒀𝒊𝒋𝒕𝝋 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝝆 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑗
+ 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡] .                                                                                                                                      (2) 
 
As in Eq. (1), we expect reciprocity to positively impact the cooperative behaviour of the regional 
tax authorities and then expect 𝛿 to be positive. In addition, we test the persistency hypothesis. In 
this regard, the function 𝑔(. ) allows 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 to appear in a variety of ways. We employ 
two alternative specifications: 
 
(i) 𝑔(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1) = 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 ; and 
(ii) 𝑔(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1) = {1[𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 = 0]; 1[𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 > 0] × 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 }, where 
1[. ] is the indicator function. 
 
The first approach is the standard dynamic model and, in this case, we expect 𝛾 to be positive; that 
is, cooperative behaviour in the previous period is expected to foster present cooperation. The 
second approach allows the effect of the lagged endogenous variable to be different depending on 
whether the previous response was a corner solution (zero) or strictly positive; then, in this case, 
𝛾 is a vector 2×1 (see Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 542-543). Specifically, in this case, we expect to find 
a persistent behaviour over time, so that zero-valued transmitted misreported revenue in t – 1 is 
expected to negatively impact the cooperative behaviour while the component 
1[𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 > 0] × 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 is expected to be positively related to the propensity 
to cooperate at time t.   
 
In dynamic Tobit models with unobserved effects, the treatment of the initial observations is a key 
issue.21 Wooldridge (2005) proposes a fairly general and tractable solution to this econometric 
issue. This approach consists in specifying a distribution for the unobserved effect, 𝑐𝑖𝑗, given the 
initial value, 𝑇𝑅𝑖0, and the exogenous variables in all time periods. This leads to a fairly 
straightforward procedure that is no different from the standard static random-effects Tobit model. 
For practical purposes, the only difference between the exogenous initial values assumption and 
Wooldridge’s approach is that the latter includes the initial values of the endogenous variable as 
additional explanatory variables in the regression.22 
 
                                                 
21 The ideal case would be that the observed panel dataset starts together with the stochastic process. In this case, the 
initial values are known constants. If data is not collected at the beginning of the process, assuming that the initial 
values are exogenous, this might lead to bias and inconsistency in the estimators (Heckman, 1981; Hyslop, 1999; 
Honore, 2002). The first period in our dataset is 1989 but the decentralisation of the relevant taxes began in the mid-
1980s, thus there are a few years for which this data is missing. Although the assumption of exogenous initial values 
might not be too strong because the missing years are relatively few in comparison to the extent of the dataset, the 
most appropriate approach is to assume that the initial values are endogenous. For a formal discussion of this issue 
see, for example, Akay (2009). 
22 For a formal discussion of these issues and a formal derivation of this model, see Wooldridge (2002, pp. 542-543; 
2005). 
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In our framework, the main incentives for a CA not to cooperate are the administrative costs and 
the financial costs of losing the financial yield of undue tax revenues. Thus, we suspect that a CA 
with relatively short-term budget constraints will decide to reduce cooperation. In order to identify 
the role of financial/budget constraints in influencing reciprocity, we interact 𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 with 
1[𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡], a dummy equal to one if region i expects a deficit in period t. We perform this interaction 
for both the static and the dynamic models. Eq. (2) is then modified as follows: 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 = max[0, 𝛾𝑔(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1) + 𝛿1𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 × 1[𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡]
+ 𝒀𝒊𝒋𝒕𝝋 + 𝑿′𝒊𝒕𝝆 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡] .                                                                             (3) 
 
Eq. (1) is also modified in a similar fashion. We expect 𝛿2 to be negative. 
 
To conclude our empirical analysis, we investigate two additional and potentially important 
dimensions of heterogeneity in the effect of reciprocity on cooperation. First, we consider 
differences in the size across different regions by interacting 𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 with 1[𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡], a 
dummy equal to one if region i has a population higher than the average. Thus Eq. (2) is modified 
in this way: 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 = max[0, 𝛾𝑔(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1) + 𝜋1𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜋2𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 × 1[𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡]
+ 𝒀𝒊𝒋𝒕𝝋 + 𝑿′𝒊𝒕𝝆 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡] .                                                                            (4) 
 
Again, Eq. (1) changes in a similar way. We expect the reciprocity linkage to be weaker for bigger 
regions, since they have less to gain from reciprocity and thus we expect 𝜋2 to be negative. Indeed, 
the size of the aggregate tax base, which is proxied by population, influences regional behaviour 
in a similar way to the one presented in the asymmetric competition literature (see, for example, 
Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991). Namely, since bigger regions have a larger aggregate tax base 
and corresponding revenues, they obtain a smaller marginal benefit from reciprocal cooperation. 
We will test for this source of heterogeneity. 
 
The second source of heterogeneity we want to investigate relates to the electoral cycle. We think 
that, in electoral years, tax authorities might want to end the administrative period with few 
pending information-sharing processes given the potential change of the executive. Thus, we 
expect the reciprocity linkage to be stronger in electoral years. Then, we interact 𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 
with 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑡 and Eq. (2) is modified in this way: 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 = max[0, 𝛾𝑔(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1) + µ1𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + µ2𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 × 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑡
+ 𝒀𝒊𝒋𝒕𝝋 + 𝑿′𝒊𝒕𝝆 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡] .                                                                              (5) 
 
Eq. (1) changes in a similar way. We expect µ2 to be positive. 
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Data and Sources 
The data on the cases of misreported taxes and their corresponding revenues, in addition to the 
regional tax and audit revenues and the dummy 𝐷𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡, are extracted from the report entitled 
“Informe sobre la cesión de tributos a las Comunidades Autónomas”. The other variables are 
obtained from the following statistical sources. The distance between two CAs is the Euclidean 
distance between their capitals, is calculated using their geographical coordinates and is expressed 
in kilometres. The political alignment is defined using the information on the political colour of 
the governments in office, which we also employ for the definition of the variable 𝐿𝑒𝑓𝑡𝑖𝑡. This 
information is obtained from Zarate’s Political Collections website (http://zarate.eu/spain2.htm). 
The relative GDP is based on data from the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE). The 
transfers-expenditure ratio is constructed as the ratio between the total amount of transfers received 
from the central government (extracted from the INE database) and the total regional expenditure 
(extracted from the Ministry of Economy and Finance database). The deficit is that expected at the 
beginning of the fiscal year, and is extracted from the database of the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance. The information on election years is obtained from the Ministry of the Interior’s website 
(http://goo.gl/YCS3J). In Table 1, we report the summary statistics. 
 
  
Journal of Tax Administration Vol 2:1 2016                                                                        Sub-Central Cooperation 
 
34 
 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Measurement unit Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Transmitted Tax Revenues thousands of 2001 euro 4,203 144.87 1,179.61 0 37,111.18 
Received Tax Revenues thousands of 2001 euro 4,206 114.30 954.11 0 38,900.90 
Cases of Transmitted 
Misreported Taxes number of cases 4,410 22.53 196.28 0 10,533 
Cases of Received 
Misreported Taxes number of cases 4,410 36.13 505.42 0 22,944 
Distance kilometres 4,410 630.73 512.75 31 2204 
Political Alignment dummy 4,410 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Relative GDP Ratio 4,410 1.04 0.29 0.46 2.15 
Tot_Reg_Tax_Revenues millions of 2001 euros 4,410 72.51 104.64 1.73 775.02 
Tot_Reg_Audit_Revenues millions of 2001 euros 3,990 3.59 6.69 0 49.85 
Deficit thousands of 2001 euro  4,200 -68,860.48 27,1390.3 -24,78177 1,270,978 
1[Deficit] dummy 4,200 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Transfers/Expenditure 
share of expenditure 
financed by transfers 4,410 0.35 0.17 -0.04 1.37 
Leftist Government dummy 4,410 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Election Year dummy 4,410 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Deduction dummy 4,410 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Population thousands of people 4,410 2,542.28 2,168.17 261.34 8,150.47 
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RESULTS 
In Table 2, we present the results of the estimation of Eq. (1), that is, the static model. We report 
a GLS random-effects specification in column (1), a standard Tobit model in column (2), and 
column (3) reports the random-effects Tobit model, which is our preferred estimation strategy. The 
amount of misreported tax revenues transmitted by CA i to CA j positively depends on reciprocity, 
which is proxied by the time-lagged tax revenues received by CA i from CA j. This result is robust 
to the different specifications. According to the random effects Tobit model reported in column 
(3), a one euro increase in the tax revenues received by CA i from CA j in year t-1 results in an 
increase of 0.385 euros of tax revenues being transmitted from CA i to CA j in year t, holding all 
other variables constant.  
 
Clearly, the amount of misreported revenues increases as the number of cases of transmitted 
misreported taxes grows. Specifically, according to model (3), one additional case of misreported 
taxes leads to an increase in transmitted revenues of almost 6.5 thousand euros, keeping constant 
all the other variables. The estimate of the distance between regions is significant and robust to the 
two different Tobit specifications presenting negative coefficients: two distant regions share less 
misreported revenues than is the case between two closer CAs. This corroborates previous results, 
as we saw in the literature review. Furthermore, we find that the deficit negatively impacts the 
cooperative behaviour of the tax administration. Those CAs with a higher expected deficit at the 
beginning of the year are less willing to transfer misreported tax revenues. 
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Table 2. Determinants of the Information-Sharing Process: TOBIT-RE and Alternative 
Specifications 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Estimator GLS-RE TOBIT TOBIT-RE 
    
L.Received Tax Revenues 0.467*** 0.438*** 0.385*** 
 (10.456) (7.351) (6.311) 
Cases of Transmitted Misreported Taxes 5.891*** 6.892*** 6.478*** 
 (23.516) (20.554) (17.874) 
Distance -0.017 -0.288*** -0.299*** 
 (-0.562) (-5.850) (-4.603) 
Political Alignment -64.845** -61.081 -45.212 
 (-2.094) (-1.293) (-0.880) 
Relative GDP -36.360 -4.180 14.190 
 (-0.587) (-0.043) (0.113) 
Tot_Reg_Tax_Revenues 11.970 1.062 8.352 
 (0.717) (0.042) (0.295) 
Tot_Reg_Audit_Revenues -0.648 -1.219 -1.158 
 (-0.777) (-1.008) (-0.908) 
Deficit  -0.000* -0.000** -0.000* 
 (-1.848) (-2.052) (-1.768) 
Transfers/Expenditure 161.385 396.833 366.767 
 (1.037) (1.580) (1.400) 
Election Year -2.153 -73.051 -74.340 
 (-0.061) (-1.340) (-1.212) 
Deduction -8.960 9.324 0.885 
 (-0.162) (0.116) (0.011) 
Leftist Government -12.665 -113.368 -89.040 
 (-0.180) (-1.126) (-0.846) 
Population 0.006 0.065*** 0.069*** 
 (0.765) (5.545) (4.401) 
_cons 48.804 -184.113 -220.779 
 (0.346) (-0.851) (-0.915) 
Observations 3,446 3,446 3,446 
Censored Observations 1,504 1,504 1,504 
Number of groups (couple of regions) 210 210 210 
R2 0.244 - - 
Log likelihood - -17,134.759 -17,112.908 
Wald chi2 1100.793 1036.608 785.558 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. For all specifications, we report χ2 statistics 
and p-values for the Wald test of joint significance. Time effects and regional dummies are included in all 
specifications.  
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As for the control variables, we find that regional size, proxied by population, is positively 
associated with the transfer of misreported tax revenues. None of the remaining covariates is found 
to be significant, but they are jointly statistically significant according to the Wald test. 
 
In Table 3, we present the results of the estimation of the alternative specifications of Eq. (2) that 
we use to test the persistency hypothesis. In columns (1) and (2), we employ specification (i), while 
in columns (3) and (4) we use specification (ii).23 The dynamic Tobit models in columns (2) and 
(4) are estimated by employing Wooldridge’s (2005) approach, while the models in columns (1) 
and (3) are estimated by assuming exogenous initial values. The results suggest that there is a 
sluggish adjustment in the process of transmission of misreported tax revenues. In models (1) and 
(2), the coefficients of 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 suggest that a one euro increase in misreported tax 
revenues transmitted by CA i to CA j in the previous year leads to an increase of almost 0.235 
euros in the transmitted misreported revenues in the current year. Moreover, the results obtained 
by means of the estimation of models (3) and (4) corroborate our hypothesis of congruency in the 
behaviour of the regional tax authorities. The CAs that did not transmit revenues in t – 1 tend to 
transmit less revenues in t, while the CAs that had transmitted revenues in t – 1 transfer, on average, 
0.023 euros more in t for any additional euro transmitted in t–1.  
 
The initial value of the transmitted misreported revenues does not turn out to be significant, 
suggesting that there is no correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity and the initial 
condition. This is probably due to the fact that the first period in our panel dataset coincides mostly 
with the true starting point generating the process. Although Wooldridge’s method is the most 
appropriate for the estimation of this process, this result indicates that the bias in the estimation of 
𝑔(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1) under the exogenous initial values assumption is not severe as confirmed by 
the magnitudes of the coefficients obtained through the two methodologies that are almost equal. 
Taking inertia into account, though, does not modify the main results obtained when estimating 
Eq. (1). In particular, reciprocity remains a driving force of the process.  
  
                                                 
23 Specifically in columns (1) and (2) we set 𝑔(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1) = 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1, while in columns (3) and (4) 
we assume 𝑔(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1) = {1[𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 = 0]; 1[𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 > 0] × 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 }. 
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Table 3. Determinants of the Information-Sharing process: Dynamic TOBIT-RE - 
Alternative Specifications 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimator TOBIT-RE TOBIT-RE TOBIT-RE TOBIT-RE 
 Exogenous 
initial 
values 
Wooldridge 
method 
Exogenous 
initial 
values 
Wooldridge 
method 
     
L.Transmitted Tax Revenues 0.234*** 0.235*** - - 
 (9.438) (9.456)   
1[L.Transmitted Tax Revenues = 0] - - -712.641*** -
712.263*** 
   (-13.257) (-13.168) 
1[L.Transmitted Tax Revenues> 0]×L.Transmitted Tax 
Revenues 
- - 0.023*** 0.023*** 
   (9.394) (9.393) 
L.Received Tax Revenues  0.327*** 0.327*** 0.378*** 0.378*** 
 (5.440) (5.442) (6.393) (6.393) 
Transmitted Tax Revenuest=1989 - 1.791 - 0.058 
  (1.512)  (0.063) 
Cases of Misreported Taxes 5.926*** 5.930*** 5.848*** 5.848*** 
 (16.620) (16.634) (17.365) (17.364) 
Distance -0.283*** -0.271*** -0.188*** -0.187*** 
 (-4.718) (-4.482) (-3.745) (-3.709) 
Political Alignment -33.301 -32.097 -66.883 -66.807 
 (-0.664) (-0.640) (-1.403) (-1.401) 
Relative GDP 10.889 17.485 -27.411 -27.191 
 (0.093) (0.149) (-0.280) (-0.278) 
Tot_Reg_Tax_Revenues 18.989 18.371 15.238 15.199 
 (0.665) (0.644) (0.576) (0.574) 
Tot_IGT_Audit_Revenues -1.600 -1.470 -1.248 -1.242 
 (-1.280) (-1.174) (-1.032) (-1.024) 
Deficit -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.485) (-1.459) (-1.502) (-1.500) 
Transfers/Expenditure 446.910* 434.541* 376.867 376.357 
 (1.700) (1.652) (1.463) (1.461) 
Election Year -49.016 -51.271 -40.768 -40.883 
 (-0.824) (-0.862) (-0.739) (-0.741) 
Deduction -2.659 -3.200 -13.971 -13.994 
 (-0.033) (-0.040) (-0.172) (-0.173) 
Leftist Government -96.980 -98.314 -77.896 -77.954 
 (-0.944) (-0.957) (-0.777) (-0.778) 
Population 0.065*** 0.061*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
 (4.468) (4.175) (3.193) (3.147) 
_cons -340.952 -351.172 -96.233 -96.555 
 (-1.442) (-1.485) (-0.434) (-0.436) 
Observations 3,405 3,405 3,405 3,405 
Censored Observations 1,490 1,490.000 1,490 1,490 
Number of groups (couple of regions) 210 210 210 210 
Log likelihood -16,845.972 -
16,844.828 
-16,769.765 -16,769.763 
Wald chi2 923.174 927.285 1,276.899 1,276.878 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. For all specifications, we report χ2 statistics 
and p-values for the Wald test of joint significance. Time effects and regional dummies are included in all 
specifications.  
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In Table 4, we report the results of the estimation when we interact 𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 with a dummy 
identifying periods of expected budget in deficit (Eq. 3).  
 
Both in the static and in the dynamic approach, we still find reciprocity to be positively associated 
with the revenue transmission process, but this relationship is weaker during the periods in which 
CA i faces relatively more binding budget constraints. In the absence of deficit, the CAs transmit 
according to the different specifications at around 0.80 – 0.84 of every 1 euro received, while in 
the presence of (an expected) deficit, they transmit less than half that amount (0.29 – 0.35 of every 
1 euro received). 
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Table 4. Determinants of the Information-Sharing Process: Interactions with High Deficit. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Estimator TOBIT-RE TOBIT-RE TOBIT-RE 
  Wooldridge 
method 
Wooldridge 
method 
    
L.Transmitted Tax Revenues - 0.238*** - 
  (9.585)  
1[L.Transmitted Tax Revenues = 0] - - -704.264*** 
   (-13.022) 
1[L.Transmitted Tax Revenues> 0]×L.Transmitted Tax Revenues - - 0.023*** 
   (9.482) 
L.Received Tax Revenues 0.798*** 0.816*** 0.836*** 
 (3.939) (4.113) (4.312) 
L.Received Tax Revenues×1[Deficit] -0.442** -0.525** -0.495** 
 (-2.125) (-2.570) (-2.474) 
Transmitted Tax Revenuest=1989 - 1.600 -0.090 
  (1.372) (-0.098) 
Cases of Misreported Taxes 6.492*** 5.933*** 5.829*** 
 (17.969) (16.726) (17.329) 
Distance -0.296*** -0.268*** -0.185*** 
 (-4.602) (-4.497) (-3.675) 
Political Alignment -47.302 -34.418 -67.460 
 (-0.923) (-0.689) (-1.417) 
Relative GDP 25.821 30.349 -15.383 
 (0.207) (0.263) (-0.157) 
Tot_Reg_Tax_Revenues 4.904 14.925 12.763 
 (0.173) (0.525) (0.482) 
Tot_IGT_Audit_Revenues -1.257 -1.607 -1.376 
 (-0.988) (-1.287) (-1.134) 
1[Deficit] 74.688 77.504 54.397 
 (1.176) (1.239) (0.862) 
Deficit -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.764) (-1.448) (-1.294) 
Transfer/Expenditure 301.820 371.018 333.402 
 (1.134) (1.393) (1.275) 
Left -73.329 -50.600 -41.794 
 (-1.197) (-0.854) (-0.756) 
Election 3.812 0.536 -10.327 
 (0.047) (0.007) (-0.128) 
Deduction -70.078 -78.229 -62.124 
 (-0.662) (-0.758) (-0.614) 
Population 0.069*** 0.061*** 0.038*** 
 (4.400) (4.200) (3.158) 
_cons -256.972 -392.334* -133.715 
 (-1.065) (-1.660) (-0.600) 
Linear Combinations    
L.Received Tax Revenues +L.Received Tax Revenues× 1[Deficit] 0.355*** 0.291*** 0.341*** 
 (5.65) (4.69) (5.59) 
Observations 3,446 3,405 3,405 
Censored Observations 1,504 1,490 1,490 
Number of groups (couple of regions) 210 210 210 
Log likelihood -17,110.207 -16,841.078 -16,766.540 
Wald chi2 796.081 944.918 1,285.733 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. For all specifications, we report χ2 statistics and p-
values for the Wald test of joint significance. Time effects and regional dummies are included in all specifications.  
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Table 5 reports the results of the estimation of Eq. (4). By considering heterogeneity in regional 
size, we find that the reciprocity linkage is significantly weaker for more populated regions. In 
particular, smaller regions transmit 1.86 – 2.12 of every 1 euro received, while bigger regions 
transmit on average about one tenth of that amount (0.19 – 0.24 of every 1 euro received). 
 
As a final exercise, we try to understand how the electoral cycle interacts with the reciprocity 
(Table 6). By interacting 𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 with the electoral dummy, we find that reciprocity linkages 
are stronger in electoral years. In presence of elections, tax administrations transmit 2.41 – 2.52 of 
every 1 euro received while otherwise they transmit 0.27 – 0.33 of every 1 euro received. 
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Table 5. Determinants of the Information-Sharing Process: Interactions with High Population. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Estimator TOBIT-RE TOBIT-RE TOBIT-RE 
  Wooldridge 
method 
Wooldridge 
method 
    
L.Transmitted Tax Revenues - 0.204*** - 
  (8.244)  
1[L.Transmitted Tax Revenues = 0] - - -682.449*** 
   (-12.844) 
1[L.Transmitted Tax Revenues> 0]×L.Transmitted Tax Revenues - - 0.020*** 
   (8.163) 
L.Received Tax Revenues 2.126*** 1.871*** 1.863*** 
 (11.969) (10.536) (10.771) 
L.Received Tax Revenues×1[HPop] -1.902*** -1.677*** -1.620*** 
 (-10.357) (-9.174) (-9.096) 
Transmitted Tax Revenuest=1989 - 1.326 -0.236 
  (1.178) (-0.261) 
Cases of Misreported Taxes 6.025*** 5.600*** 5.494*** 
 (17.050) (16.050) (16.524) 
Distance -0.272*** -0.252*** -0.168*** 
 (-4.401) (-4.346) (-3.364) 
Political Alignment -43.665 -32.574 -64.862 
 (-0.878) (-0.667) (-1.387) 
Relative GDP 8.674 10.505 -23.210 
 (0.073) (0.094) (-0.241) 
Tot_Reg_Tax_Revenues 23.738 32.390 27.615 
 (0.867) (1.167) (1.063) 
Tot_IGT_Audit_Revenues -0.747 -1.124 -0.938 
 (-0.604) (-0.921) (-0.789) 
Deficit -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.660) (-0.547) (-0.543) 
Transfer/Expenditure 348.880 429.546* 374.739 
 (1.372) (1.674) (1.484) 
Left -83.175 -62.253 -45.212 
 (-1.374) (-1.050) (-0.808) 
Election -26.256 -26.948 -37.095 
 (-0.335) (-0.344) (-0.467) 
Deduction -23.766 -41.642 -21.093 
 (-0.232) (-0.414) (-0.214) 
Population 0.098*** 0.088*** 0.049** 
 (3.520) (3.331) (2.177) 
1[HPop] -89.429 -77.344 9.864 
 (-0.723) (-0.662) (0.098) 
_cons -421.474* -518.854** -268.564 
 (-1.805) (-2.253) (-1.232) 
Linear Combinations    
L.Received Tax Revenues +L.Received Tax Revenues× 1[HPop] 0.224*** 0.194** 0.244*** 
 (3.64) (3.20) (4.08) 
Observations 3,446 3,405 3,405 
Censored Observations 1,504 1,490 1,490 
Number of groups (couple of regions) 210 210 210 
Log likelihood -17060.233 -16803.221 -16729.211 
Wald chi2 940.659 1060.800 1393.584 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. For all specifications, we report χ2 statistics and p-
values for the Wald test of joint significance. Time effects and regional dummies are included in all specifications.  
Journal of Tax Administration Vol 2:1 2016                                                                        Sub-Central Cooperation 
 
43 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Determinants of the Information-Sharing Process: Interactions with Electoral Year. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Estimator TOBIT-RE TOBIT-RE TOBIT-RE 
  Wooldridge 
method 
Wooldridge 
method 
    
L.Transmitted Tax Revenues - 0.242*** - 
  (9.937)  
1[L.Transmitted Tax Revenues = 0] - - -684.458*** 
   (-12.918) 
1[L.Transmitted Tax Revenues> 0]×L.Transmitted Tax Revenues - - 0.023*** 
   (9.809) 
L.Received Tax Revenues 0.333*** 0.230*** 0.274*** 
 (5.595) (3.847) (4.654) 
L.Received Tax Revenues×1[Election] 2.191*** 2.196*** 2.141*** 
 (9.158) (9.353) (9.084) 
Transmitted Tax Revenuest=1989 - 1.553 -0.095 
  (1.360) (-0.106) 
Cases of Misreported Taxes 7.039*** 6.114*** 5.995*** 
 (21.383) (17.574) (18.155) 
Distance -0.268*** -0.250*** -0.171*** 
 (-5.553) (-4.288) (-3.457) 
Political Alignment -63.746 -36.057 -68.385 
 (-1.376) (-0.737) (-1.465) 
Relative GDP 18.785 40.040 -2.340 
 (0.198) (0.354) (-0.024) 
Tot_Reg_Tax_Revenues -14.103 -0.673 -1.610 
 (-0.563) (-0.024) (-0.062) 
Tot_IGT_Audit_Revenues -1.519 -1.729 -1.544 
 (-1.279) (-1.411) (-1.297) 
Deficit -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.780) (-1.211) (-1.207) 
Transfer/Expenditure 291.006 307.052 262.837 
 (1.179) (1.192) (1.039) 
Left -88.218* -68.656 -57.191 
 (-1.650) (-1.184) (-1.058) 
Election 54.503 44.437 33.057 
 (0.687) (0.568) (0.416) 
Deduction -117.021 -107.937 -83.278 
 (-1.185) (-1.076) (-0.848) 
Population 0.056*** 0.052*** 0.030** 
 (4.869) (3.665) (2.556) 
_cons -117.984 -261.440 -29.716 
 (-0.555) (-1.134) (-0.137) 
Linear Combinations    
L.Received Tax Revenues +L.Received Tax Revenues× 1[Election] 2.524*** 2.426*** 2.415*** 
 (10.74) (10.47) (10.44) 
Observations 3,446 3,405 3,405 
Censored Observations 1,504 1,490 1,490 
Number of groups (couple of regions) 210 210 210 
Log likelihood -17093.838 -16802.281 -16729.673 
Wald chi2 1134.267 1061.395 1397.541 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. For all specifications, we report χ2 statistics and p-values 
for the Wald test of joint significance. Time effects and regional dummies are included in all specifications.  
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CONCLUSIONS  
We have analysed an area of horizontal tax interdependence that may occur in federal contexts, 
namely, the transmission of misreported tax revenues between sub-central tax administrations. We 
have obtained some evidence of the determinants of cooperation between the Spanish regional tax 
authorities. Our analysis suggests that cooperation is a matter of reciprocity and so we corroborate 
the results of the relevant theoretical literature. More specifically, the amount of tax revenues 
transmitted from one region to another positively depends on the revenues received from the latter 
in the previous period. This is the main result of the paper, and it is significant and robust to 
different specifications.  
 
According to our results, the existence of a reciprocity linkage between CAs is crucial in 
determining their level of cooperation in managing misreporting of taxes. The robustness of this 
result suggests, even in absence of a counterfactual, that regional tax authorities behave 
strategically and do, under certain conditions, cooperate with each other in dealing with this 
problem. Namely, we have identified two main barriers that might reduce the sub-central tax 
administrations’ incentives to cooperate. The existence of administrative and transaction costs 
directly related to the information-sharing process may induce a regional tax administration not to 
cooperate. Similarly, cooperation implies a financial cost due to the loss of revenue yields, which 
we find particularly important for the CAs that face budget constraints measured in terms of high 
deficit. However, our results suggest that. Typically, both barriers to cooperation act in the short-
run, causing a delay in the transmission of relevant information. Indeed, the estimation of a 
dynamic model suggests that there is a sluggish adjustment in the setting of this process. We have 
explored different types of heterogeneity in the effect of reciprocity on the endogenous variable, 
finding that regional size reduces this effect on cooperation while the presence of electoral years 
tends to enhance it. Furthermore, we have found that the reciprocity link existing between two 
CAs becomes weaker when budget constraints are binding, i.e. in the presence of an expected 
deficit. This confirms the presence of barriers to cooperation due to the existence of financial costs. 
 
Therefore, although a decentralised tax administration might entail some inefficiency costs due to 
a lack of incentives to collaborate across administrations, we prove that once they engage in 
cooperative behaviour, this is maintained, fostering even closer cooperation between them. This is 
a crucial point, because it suggests that once regional tax administrations become aware of the 
potential benefits of cooperation, they do not deviate from this equilibrium. In this regard, the 
central government could play a role in promoting the advantages of cooperation. All in all, this is 
good news for the functioning of a decentralised tax administration as, in this context, strategic 
considerations regarding tax base attraction might not be an issue. Further research, though, should 
be carried out to analyse other aspects of the functioning of tax administration in a federal context. 
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